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Abstract The Multistatic Tactical Planning Aid
(MSTPA) is a tool currently in development at NATO
Undersea Research Centre which may be used to
model the performance of a given multistatic sensor
network in terms of the probability of detection of
a submarine, the ability to hold a track and whether
such a track could be correctly classified as such.
The tool therefore considers the entire chain of
events from an initial calculation of signal excess, the
generation of a contact considering localisation errors,
followed by the subsequent tracking and classification
process. In its current form, the tool may be used
to plan a particular multistatic scenario through
operational analysis of many Monte Carlo simulations.
The future development of MSTPA will transition
towards a real-time decision support tool to assist
operators and planners at sea. This study introduces
a number of generic decision support techniques
which may be wrapped around the MSTPA tool. The
acoustic performance metric that will drive decisions
will of course be subject to uncertainty relating to
environmental measurements and extrapolations. The
effect of this uncertainty on acoustic performance
is examined here. Future studies will consider the
sensitivity of the eventual decision—in terms of opti-
mum sensor positions—to the acoustic uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
The Multistatic Tactical Planning Aid (MSTPA) is
a tool currently in development at NATO Undersea
Research Centre (NURC) which may be used to model
the performance of a given multistatic sensor network
in terms of the probability of detection of a submarine,
the ability to hold a track and whether such a track
could be correctly classified. The tool considers the
entire chain of events from an initial calculation of
signal excess (Harrison 2002), the generation of a con-
tact considering localisation errors (Coraluppi 2003),
followed by the subsequent tracking and classification
processes (Wathelet et al. 2006, 2008b). The premise
behind the MSTPA model is to model each part of
the chain in relatively simple terms, whilst maintaining
sufficient fidelity from signal excess to eventual clas-
sification. This methodology drives MSTPA towards its
goal of becoming a decision support tool as opposed to
a purely acoustic model. A more detailed description of
MSTPA and the algorithms it employs may be found in
Wathelet et al. (2006).
The MSTPA tool is primarily designed to assess
the performance of multistatic scenarios in which, by
definition, sources and receivers may be spatially dis-
tributed on separate platforms. Such a disposition is
known to increase area coverage and decrease the
ability of a submarine to evade detection since many
acoustic pathways exist between it and the receivers.
However, the performance increase comes at the cost
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of increased operational complexity due to the many
possible sensor geometries and the need for reliable
underwater communication and coordination between
the source and receivers. As nations begin to procure
sonar systems with a multistatic capability, there is a
very real need for a tool such as MSTPA to automate
the planning process and to increase the situational
awareness and understanding of its operators.
The MSTPA tool must consider the optimisation of
both static and dynamic multistatic networks. The static
type might include a barrier to detect the transit of
a threat submarine through a given area. A dynamic
scenario might consider the persistent deployment of a
number of autonomous vehicles with multistatic capa-
bility in order to act as a reactive area search network.
This scenario is currently receiving much attention
at NURC as part of the cooperative anti-submarine
warfare project in which a distributed and persistent
network of autonomous sensors is envisaged (Hughes
et al. 2010; Been et al. 2010). This scenario will include
the use of static sources combined with a number of
mobile platforms towing arrays with which to make
multistatic detections. The MSTPA tool may be used as
a test bed for AUV behaviours in which realistic false
contacts are generated in order to test the ability of such
behaviours to react to the true target whilst discrimi-
nating against false contacts and tracks. This report will
consider mostly the static deployment case in order to
decrease the number of variables to optimise such that
the concepts of decision support may be investigated
(see Section 3).
In essence, the aim is to investigate generic decision
support techniques that may be ‘wrapped around’ the
existing MSTPA model (acting as a central metric cal-
culator) in order to aid the decision-making process.
This must begin with the automated extraction and
analysis of environmental data—whether measured,
modelled or forecast, such that the relevant information
is passed onto the MSTPA model. Already, we see
that the MSTPA acoustic, tracking and classification
engine becomes just one module within a greater chain
of decision support techniques. This must be the case,
since any optimisation or decision-making process must
at some point determine the effectiveness of given op-
tions. It is here that the existing MSTPA modules must
calculate relevant metrics for the particular scenario
being considered. The results from the MSTPA model
will be integrated with techniques to analyse the ex-
pected threat decisions, automatically re-examine the
scenario and re-plan accordingly to determine a best
solution. This process will feature elements of both
decision theory—in order to mathematically describe
the options and choices available to both threat and
friendly forces (and to rate their utility)—and game
theory in order to play out the potential combinations
of threat and friendly options until an optimum is
determined.
Recent advances within the core acoustic element
of the model allow for the ingestion of fully 3-D tem-
perature and salinity data as may be measured at sea.
The recent REP10 experiment demonstrated rapid en-
vironmental assessment in which glider measurements,
satellite measurements and advanced oceanographic
models were combined in a super-ensemble to produce
accurate 3-D maps of temperature and salinity, with
forecasts up to 72 h. Initial results are presented in
which the uncertainty inherent in the oceanographic
measurements and forecasts are transitioned into the
final acoustic coverage product. Environmental un-
certainty is represented here through the 3-D super-
ensemble (3DSE) uncertainty and is sampled in order
to generate a number of candidate temperature and
salinity fields. Each is then used to generate a signal
excess coverage map from which the final operational
uncertainty (the detectability of a submarine) may be
determined.
The final step in the decision support chain is the
presentation of results to the operator. At this point,
a number of human factors come into consideration
when attempting to present complicated information to
operational personnel. There are two broad approaches
to the eventual output of a decision aid. Firstly, the
tool may simply output what it has determined to be
the ‘answer’. This may be the optimal positions for all
sources and receivers within the scenario and the oper-
ator need only implement this plan. Secondly, the tool
might display the performance metrics for a number
of different solutions allowing the operator to make
the final decision. This second option is most likely to
be preferred by the operational community who are
intelligent, well-trained professionals that are used to
making difficult decisions. At this point, the distinction
between a decision support tool and a decision making
tool becomes apparent. The tool should assist decisions
by presenting the relevant information together with
candidate solutions such that the operator still has the
final say. A tool acting as a black box which spits out
answers is unlikely to be trusted.
The following broad topics will be investigated dur-
ing the course of this paper, and their application to-
wards transitioning MSTPA into a decision support
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Fig. 1 Decision support framework
The above processes will be wrapped around the
existing MSTPA modules as described in Fig. 1. It is
hoped that the additional modules will be sufficiently
generic such that they may be quickly applied to addi-
tional scenarios—such as glider path planning—simply
by replacing the core metric calculating module, that
is, replacing a multistatic model with a model of glider
dynamics and data sampling requirements such that
the same decision theory modules may be applied but
with different calculations of measures of effectiveness.
The ability to transform a scientific tool into decision
support software is a powerful ideal that will facilitate
the rapid transition of scientific research towards oper-
ational relevance.
2 Decision support concepts
Before examining some of the decision support tech-
niques in more detail, let us first examine just what
is meant by decision support and what exactly consti-
tutes a good decision. Decision support systems are a
core subject area of the information systems discipline
and at the most fundamental level are concerned with
representing and processing knowledge for the purpose
of improving decision making. An understanding of
decision support must include that of decisions and de-
cision making which in turn requires an understanding
of knowledge and knowledge management. A decision
support system is a computer-based system that rep-
resents and processes knowledge in ways that allow
decision making to be more productive, agile, innova-
tive and/or reputable (Burstein and Holsapple 2008). It
is therefore no surprise that the field of data mining
(the first module in our proposed decision support
chain) may be considered as the extraction of knowl-
edge/information from data. Van Lohuizen identifies a
progression of six states of knowledge beginning with
data, through information, and culminating in a deci-
sion as shown in Fig. 2 (Wali Van Lohuizen 1986).
A decision is regarded as a choice between a number
of courses of action, such as the strategies that may be
employed by the decision maker. In the field of deci-
sion theory, the decision maker (or rational agent) will
choose the strategy with the greatest expected utility
(Von-neumann and Morgenstern 1953)—utility being
the measure of satisfaction derived from each outcome.
A decision support tool mimics this method in that it
considers all possible choices, assessing each according
to some metric (the utility) and determining the best.
A computer-based system is well suited to assessing a
large number of options in a systematic manner and
presenting this information to the decision maker. In
fact, the tool need not return a single best solution but
a number of alternatives for the decision maker to com-
pare using the system calculated metrics. This highlights
the nature of the proposed tool as being a decision
support tool and not necessarily a decision making tool.
Fig. 2 Knowledge as a
progression of states
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In the military context in which our scenario lies, a
black box spitting out a single decision (instruction)
to well-trained intelligent personnel is unlikely to be
trusted and will eventually be ignored. Presenting al-
ternative solutions along with their respective metrics
(time permitting), especially those that could not be
determined in the operators head, is a far more sensible
approach.
The presentation of supporting evidence along with
a decision may help to alleviate a common problem
with decision support systems. The problem is that of
the cognitive bias of the operator, whereby he may
be expecting a particular solution and be unwilling
to accept any alternative (Davis et al. 2005). Such a
bias can arise from many factors including habit in
which familiar results are given more weight based on
previous outcomes. In the military scenarios considered
here, the decision support tool may have to operate in
the face of ingrained doctrine and training. If a result
is presented which appears to contradict this, perhaps
because complicated environmental factors were previ-
ously unaccounted for, the operator may question the
result. As soon as a result is questioned, the trust in
the tool is compromised and it may soon be ignored
all together. This problem may be countered by supple-
menting results with evidence in the form of a metric
calculation and possible alternative courses of action
with lower metrics. In effect, the operator is brought
into the decision process and is allowed to make up his
own mind with help from the tool.
There is then a balance which must be found be-
tween the level of information presented by the tool
and the level of understanding required by the opera-
tor. As already discussed, a single answer determined
by the tool requiring no thought on the part of the
operator is not an ideal situation—nor is displaying all
outcomes with some metric that is not understood by
the operator. This suggests a two-pronged approach to
improving automated decision support tools:
1. The tools must be made more user-friendly.
2. The user should be trained to understand the un-
derlying assumptions/metrics of the tool.
In effect, the goal is to optimise the fit between
the decision tool and its user by developing the tool
and training the operator. Current decision science
recommends a number of ways to increase the usage
and trustworthiness of these tools through the following
design features (Davis et al. 2005):
1. Allow personalisation—decision makers rate a tool
as more usable when they can customize certain
features.
2. Use graphical interfaces—decision makers rate
graphical tools as more trustworthy than text-based
modules.
3. Maintain interactivity—decision makers prefer in-
teractive tools to non-interactive tools.
4. Limit pre-processing of data—decision makers pre-
fer decision support calculations (such as ranking
alternatives) that can be easily linked to concepts
in the ‘hard data’. They should have access to all of
the underlying data used by the tool.
We will leave the precise definition of our perfor-
mance metric until the next section where we consider
the scenario in more detail. However, regardless of the
metric, we may elaborate on what is a good decision—
or at least what exactly the proposed decision support
system should achieve. To this end, two desirable out-
comes are considered:
1. The performance metric is better than an otherwise
manual solution.
2. The solution is derived faster than a manual
solution.
Generally, the tool should decrease the effort re-
quired to plan a mission whilst at the same time result in
better operational performance. We might expect, for
example, a reduction in the level of resources required
(platforms, fuel, staffing etc.) to fulfil a given mission.
This leads towards two forms of optimum result: one in
which the mission outcome is the same but required less
resources and another in which the mission outcome is
itself improved.
The second point above is an important one in that
it considers the time taken to generate a decision. Mil-
itary forces seek to win an engagement by making de-
cisions quicker than the enemy using a concept known
as the OODA loop, standing for observe, orient, decide
and act (developed by military strategist and USAF
Colonel John Boyd). Friendly forces seek to ‘get inside’
the enemies OODA loop by making their decisions
faster to gain the advantage (Rosenberg 2010). In fact,
making a less optimum decision faster than the ene-
mies optimum decisions can allow for friendly forces
to out manoeuvre the enemy and gain the upper hand.
This particular way of thinking applies mostly to more
dynamic scenarios and threats than will be considered
in the context of this study. However, since we seek
to produce generic modules that may be applied to
any scenario, the speed at which decisions are made
should be considered. One possible scenario that is not
far removed from that considered here is the optimum
deployment and behaviour of a fleet of autonomous
underwater vehicles. If the decision aid can react to
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changes in the environment and platform positions
faster than the threat submarine, then the system have
the advantage.
An important note should be made regarding the
problem of uncertainty within decision support sys-
tems, in particular, the effect of environmental uncer-
tainty on sonar performance—crucial for the scenarios
considered here. For example, the translation of un-
certainty in sound velocity profile (as determined by
interpolation from glider tracks) to uncertainty in signal
excess is examined here. However, this relates to a
single step within the decision support process, and fur-
ther studies will examine the flow of uncertainty from
input data to eventual optimum decision. The problem
of uncertainty in both input data and output decisions
might require a search for a strategy that is most robust.
In this case, an optimum solution is one that is least
susceptible to the inevitable uncertainties within the
decision process. As an example, consider the problem
of mine clearance. A mine hunter might plan a mission
and, on completion, report that the area clearance is
between 65% and 70%. This accurate result will allow
the planners of the operation to conduct further mine
hunting operations and allow for the eventual passage
of follow-on traffic through the area. However, a clear-
ance result of between 50% and 90%—although on
average higher—reduces the confidence of the mission
planners and does not allow for accurate follow on
planning.
3 The scenario
The baseline scenario considered in this study is that of
the deployment of a fixed network of multistatic sonar
sensors attempting to detect the transit of a submarine
through an area of interest. This scenario type is re-
ferred to as a barrier and is common in anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) operations whereby a submarine is
suspected to transit through a well-defined area. Con-
stricted transit through a specified area may occur due
to geographical narrowing of the water space—a choke
point, or perhaps at the exit of a port or harbour
facility. Such a scenario serves to decrease a number
of variables and results in a more manageable scenario
with which to begin the transition of MSTPA towards
decision support software.
A barrier scenario allows for a well-defined scenario
area through which a target must transit. This leads
to a better understanding of target behaviour/mission
since it must in general enter one side of the scenario
area and exit at the opposite end. This is in contrast to
an area search problem in which no such assumption
may be made as to the general motion of the target
which might even chose to remain stationary in order
to remain undetected for as long as possible.
A further assumption is that the receiving nodes are
covert—the submarine cannot detect them. This is an
important assumption and one that is often quoted as
being an inherent advantage of multistatic systems—
the inability of a target to determine where the re-
ceivers are located will limit his ability to counter them
and thus raise the performance of the network. In
such a scenario, the target will of course be aware
of the presence of the sound source, by counter de-
tecting its transmission, but will have no way of de-
termining any information about the number (if any)
and position of the distributed network of multistatic
receivers.
Having settled upon a particular scenario (problem),
a suitable performance metric must be defined. We
consider the number of detections, track initiations or
successful classifications of a submarine for a given
multistatic sensor configuration. Such a metric also
leads to the corresponding measure of success for the
threat, this being the negative of the network success
metric. These metrics lead nicely into the domain of
game theory as will be seen in Section 4.
4 Game theory
Game theory is an extension of decision theory in which
the utility (measure of success) of a player’s strategy is
a function of the strategy chosen by the other player.
The sensor placement scenario is a two-player game in
which one—the target—seeks to minimise the number
of times he is detected—whilst the other player—the
network planner—seeks to maximise the number of
detections. Since the metrics of the two players are
completely opposed, the game is non-cooperative. In
such a game, each player must have at least an eye on
minimising the payoff to the other player whilst still
seeking to maximise his own. The following discussion
presents initial analysis combining the use of the A*
path planning algorithm within a game theoretic setting
(Strode 2009).
The A* algorithm may be described as follows:
Given a weighted directional graph G with a distin-
guished start node s and a set of goal nodes τ , the
optimal path problem is to find a least-cost path from s
to any member of τ , where the cost of the path may, in
general, be an arbitrary function of the weights assigned
to the nodes and branches along that path (Dechter
1985). The algorithm applies an additive evaluation
function f (n) = g(n) + h(n), where g(n) is the cost of
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the currently evaluated path from s to n and h(n) is
a heuristic estimate of the cost of the path remaining
between n and any member of τ .
Let us assume that both the multistatic network
planner and submarine commander are aware of the
existence of a barrier consisting of a source and three
receivers—though not their actual location. This is a
necessary assumption of equal knowledge and is es-
sential to solving the game. We begin the analysis by
considering a total of eight possible sensor geometries
using an ad hoc design—the process may be applied
to any number of geometries within the constraints of
processing time (the current analysis is completed in
7 min). Note that in some cases a receiver is placed at
the same position as the source resulting in a combined
monostatic and multistatic network. The submarine is
assumed to enter the scenario area, detect and localise
the source and thereafter choose a strategy—or path—
with which to transit the barrier. The submarine uses
the A* path planning algorithm to determine his opti-
mal track against each possible sensor geometry (G1–
G8) using the technique described in Strode (2009).
The resulting optimum tracks—those with the least
detections—are shown in Fig. 3 for all eight potential
network geometries.
Of course, the submarine commander cannot know
which geometry has been deployed, nor can the multi-
static network planner know which track the submarine
will adopt. Consequently, both players must determine
the number of detections for each optimised track
against all network geometries. In other words, what
happens if the submarine chooses to optimise against
G3 but the planner chose G6? The game theoretic
element comes into play when we consider the follow-
ing thought process—the target can optimise perfectly
against a particular geometry but the planner knows
this and so will not lay it. In effect, we consider a
more realistic level of threat intelligence in which the
submarine does not have complete knowledge of the
network—and therefore cannot simply generate a sin-
gle optimum track through it.
A game theoretic solution is only as complete as
the consideration of the various strategies that might
be employed by each player. For instance, might we
consider a further random path or straight path which
the target could employ as a strategy against the net-
work? This is a common problem when setting up a
game theoretic solution—not considering all possible
choices. However, in this case, we are giving the target
the ability to generate an optimum track in all cases. We
know from Strode (2009) that the resulting A* paths
are optimum and always better than a straight (or any
other) path.













































































Fig. 3 Optimised path for target transiting from top to bottom
through barrier
Suppose we add an additional column to the decision
matrix for a straight line transit through the network.
Since the A* track is optimal, the payoff to the target
for the straight track must be worse. In fact, even if the
straight track was optimal, the A* would have returned
that same track. Therefore, all payoffs for the straight
line tactic will be worse or the same as that of the A*
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equivalent. The straight line tactic is then dominated
by the A* tactic and can be removed from the matrix
without affecting the outcome of the game. This is the
case for any other potential tactic that can be envisaged.
Consequently, we need not consider any other target
tactics. The only room for improvement is to consider
more and more potential geometries—planner strate-
gies. A further study will examine the robustness of the
mixed strategy to additional geometries—in effect, the
optimum spatial resolution of potential sensor positions
must be determined. The combination of optimum path
generation with a game theoretic approach is a pow-
erful one employing intelligent path planning whilst
taking into account the target’s incomplete knowledge
of the network geometry.
The number of target detections for all combina-
tions of planner and target strategy are given in matrix
format in Table 1. The score within each element of
the array gives the payoff to the planner—the payoff
to the target is the negative of the displayed value. In
this way, the planer seeks to maximise the number in
the array whilst, at the same time, the target seeks to
minimise. This game may be described as two player,
non-cooperative, zero sum. The matrix given in Table 1
is said to be the normal form of the game in which the
payoff to the row player (the planner) is given. The
matrix is later referred to as aij with subscripts i and j
relating to rows (planner strategy) and columns (target
strategy), respectively.
What information can be derived from Table 1?
The aim is of course to determine the optimal sensor
geometry to deploy—in a game theoretic sense, this
will be a compromise between the conflicting aims of
both planner and target. A quick analysis reveals that,
as expected, if the target optimises against the correct
geometry (values along the diagonal), the number of
detections is reduced, usually to zero. Geometries 5
and 6 would appear to be the best option from the
planner’s point of view since, even if the target correctly
optimises against them, he is still detected. However,
if a particular geometry was an obvious choice for the
planner, the target would simply optimise correctly and
the result of the game would be (at best) a single
detection. In keeping with the premise of MSTPA,
a single detection is unlikely to allow the planner to
react against the threat and generate a suitable fire
control solution—requiring the generation of a track
and subsequent classification as a threat. Game theory
may be used to solve the decision matrix in such a way
as to find the optimal solution for the planner—and by
extension the target.
It can also be seen that, on occasion, a target opti-
mising against the wrong geometry still remains unde-
tected. For example, had the target chosen to optimise
against G4 but the network was in fact G2 he is still
undetected. This analysis might suggest that geome-
try G2 should not be adopted by the planner since
there are two possible outcomes resulting in zero target
detections.
Inspection of Table 1 reveals that no strategies for
either planner or target are dominated—that is always
equal or worse than any other. The solution of this
game is expected to be a mix of strategies for both
planner and target. Since if a single geometry was the
planners best strategy, the target could counter it and
guarantee a worst case of a single detection. Many
games of this type result in a mixed solution by which
each strategy is given a probability that it should be
employed. In this way, the target cannot know exactly
which geometry will be deployed and must in turn
implement his own mixture of strategies. This is an
interesting result since it hints towards the value of the
covert receivers. We know that if the target could de-
termine the location of the receivers, he could optimise
against the geometry and greatly reduce the number of
detections. The game theoretic solution acknowledges
this fact and therefore returns a mixture of strategies
for the planner in order to maintain an ‘element of
surprise’ over the target.
The result of the game theoretic solution, assuming it
is greater than 1, provides a convenient measure of the
value of covertness. A normal form matrix, as given in
Table 1 Matrix game for a
barrier scenario (showing
payoff to planner)
Planner strategy Target strategy (geometry to optimise against)
(geometry to lay) G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8
G1 0 14 0 10 16 14 16 9
G2 9 0 5 0 13 9 13 9
G3 11 21 0 15 15 16 15 9
G4 15 11 8 0 13 14 13 11
G5 19 29 22 42 1 20 9 11
G6 10 12 7 7 10 1 10 1
G7 23 20 14 19 10 16 0 0
G8 20 17 17 17 14 14 9 0
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Table 1, may be solved using linear programming tech-
niques (Owen 1995), whereby a mixed strategy over the
set of pure strategies can be found that optimises the
expected payoff to both players. A mixed strategy is
a vector defining the probability with which each pure
strategy should be played. If the planner uses the mixed
strategy xi = (x1, ..., xm), he can assure himself of an
expectation at least equal to λ, where λ is any number
such that
∑
aijxi ≥ λ for j = 1, . . . , n where aij is the
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Thus, the problem of obtaining an optimal strategy
for the planner reduces to the linear program








xi ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , m
Similarly, the solution for the target reduces to the
linear program




aijy j + μ ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , m
n∑
j=1
y j = 1
yi ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , n
Solving the linear program using the Matlab toolbox
results in the following mixed strategy for the planner:
x = (0.1, 0.0, 0.0, 0.7, 0.2, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0)
whilst the target will employ the mixed strategy
y = (0.0, 0.0, 0.2, 0.1, 0.4, 0.0, 0.0, 0.3)
The value of the game derived from the above so-
lution is 10.6, this being the average number of target
detections made by the network. Note that, had the tar-
get known the position of the receivers, he would have
been detected no more than once. This then measures
the value of the covertness of the network.
A question arises, however, as to the meaning of this
average result and indeed the probability distribution
over geometries, for a network that will be laid only
once. Whilst a number of threat submarines may indeed
attempt to penetrate the barrier over time—applying
an appropriate strategy mix—the network itself is de-
ployed only once and is thereafter fixed. Consequently,
a strategy mix for the planner might seem rather
meaningless—except that it suggests he should lay one
of several geometries—thereby depriving the threat of
complete knowledge. The decision support tool can of
course roll a dice to determine which of the geometries
the planner should lay according to the mixed strategy
solution. The important point is that the target cannot
know which geometry was laid, even if he used the
same decision support tool whilst pretending to be the
planner. This concept is known as a ‘chance device’
(Wagner et al. 1999) and ensures that the opponent
cannot predict the outcome.
Williams (1954) states:
Consider a non-repeatable game which is
terribly important to you, and in which your
opponent has excellent human intelligence of
all kinds. Also assume that it will be murder-
ous if your opponent knows which strategy
you will adopt. Your only hope is to select a
strategy by a chance device which the enemies
intelligence cannot master—he may be lucky
of course and anticipate your choice anyway
but you have to accept some risk. Game theory
simply tells you the characteristics your chance
device should have.
It is possible that the game theoretic approach be
applied to the more dynamic scenario in which the
behaviour of mobile sensors is considered. In this case,
a normal form matrix could be envisaged in which
sensor strategies are no longer a fixed position but
a complete description of a particular behaviour. For
example, a behaviour may be a simple close range
approach or the maximise signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
behaviour described in LePage (2010). Similarly, target
behaviours could range from simple random course
alterations (assuming he has not detected the mobile
sensor) or maximise range (assuming he has detected
the sensor). A normal form payoff matrix, containing
all combinations of sensor and target behaviour, could
be determined from simulations and solved using the
technique described above.
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5 Optimisation
Work has been conducted on the addition of op-
timisation routines to the MSTPA tool. In particu-
lar, the use of genetic algorithms (GA) to optimise
static sensor placement and dynamic platform way-
points has previously been reported in Wathelet et al.
(2008a).
The approach taken in MSTPA to determine the
optimum placement of selected ASW assets against a
threat submarine is to maximise a number of mea-
sures of effectiveness (MOE). Current MOEs include
the detection area coverage and the probability that a
submarine will be detected or tracked before crossing
a barrier. Optimisation algorithms are used in MSTPA
to determine the best placement of the ASW assets by
maximising these MOEs.
MSTPAs optimiser uses a set of heuristic optimisa-
tion algorithms. These are used to maximise the MOEs
that describe the ASW mission of interest. The missions
currently in MSTPA include static area surveillance,
barrier operation and force protection. The MOEs that
relate to these missions are, respectively, area cover-
age, barrier coverage and area coverage around a high
value unit.
MSTPA maximises the MOEs, namely the detection
area coverage and the probability that a submarine will
be detected or tracked before crossing a barrier, using
a set of optimisation algorithms from the JavaEvA
(a Java implementation of Evolutionary Algorithms)
open source library (Streichert and Ulmer 2005). Al-
though many algorithms are included as part of this
library, such as simulated annealing, hill climbers and
Monte Carlo search, the main technique used and re-
ported in Wathelet et al. (2008a) is a GA.
The basic concept of a genetic algorithm is to loosely
model the principle of evolution through natural selec-
tion. The algorithm represents a typical solution to the
problem as a vector of source and receiver positions.
A population of these individuals is created, and opera-
tors such as mutation and recombination are applied on
the population of individuals to arrive at an individual
that maximises the fitness function. For example, in the
area coverage scenario, the GA will determine the x
and y position of each asset that maximises the area
coverage function.
Fig. 4 Sequential output
from MSTPA genetic
algorithm
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The example shown in Fig. 4 shows intermediate
sensor positions generated by the genetic algorithm
(labelled 1–3) on its way towards finding the optimal
solution (4). The performance metric in this case is the
area of the scenario with a signal excess value greater
than 0 (shaded blue). The scenario includes a mono-
static sensor (Tx+Rx) with an additional multistatic
receiver (Rx) which may be placed anywhere in the
scenario area. The environment is characterised by an
iso-velocity sound speed profile over a continental shelf
bathymetry shown in the figure.
The GA solution shown in Fig. 4 generated 1,000
candidate geometries on its way towards the optimal
solution. The area coverage metric for each geometry
required 75 × 75 signal excess calculations. The solu-
tion therefore required over 5.5 million signal excess
calculations, each taking into account range-dependent
bathymetry. The iso-velocity sound speed assumption,
combined with the fast closed-form algorithms de-
scribed in Harrison (2002), allowed for the solution to
be obtained in only 7.5 min. Signal excess is determined
to be the difference between the actual SNR and that
required for the sonar system to register a detection.
The acoustic propagation and reverberation is mod-
elled using a mode stripping approach with Lambert’s
law scattering (Harrison 2002).
When modelling individual targets transiting
through a network, there are a number of options as
to what their precise behaviour may be. The simplest
approach is to model a large number of targets
on different (but unchanging) headings. For each
geometry, the percentage that were detected may
be determined and used as a cost measure within
an optimisation routine. When considering a barrier
scenario in which targets transit through a network
from ‘top’ to ‘bottom’, perhaps on headings between
160◦ and 200◦, it was often the case that a large
proportion of targets would have been tracked at
some point during their transit. This can give a false
impression of the effectiveness of the network due to
the assumption that all targets are completely unaware
of its presence and continue ‘blindly’ on. This type of
threat behaviour is unlikely considering the ability to
counter detect the source.
There is then a scale of threat intelligence that may
be applied to the problem of optimising network per-
formance. The simplest and least intelligent threat is
the straight running one already discussed. We might
then imagine targets that are aware of the transmission
of the source and attempt to evade in some reactive
way. Lastly, as a worst-case (most intelligent) target,
we might consider one with complete knowledge of the
network and an ability to generate an optimum (e.g.
least detectable) path through it. A network that is
optimised against such a worst-case target is likely to
be the most robust.
The worst-case, most intelligent threat has previ-
ously been modelled using the A* algorithm with which
it determines an optimal path through the network
according to a number of metrics (Wathelet et al. 2008a;
Strode 2009). The combination of the A* algorithm
with the game theoretic approach detailed in Section 4
Fig. 5 Typical glider track
showing temperature
measurements
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Fig. 6 3-D sound speed
volume from super-ensemble
output with bathymetry
of this paper considers the fact that the target cannot
know the location of covert receivers and must make
a ‘best guess’ as to how to penetrate the barrier. This
then relates to an intermediate level of intelligence
between simple straight running and that of complete
knowledge.
6 Accounting for environmental uncertainty
Recent advances within the core acoustic element of
the MSTPA model account for fully 3-D temperature
and salinity data. The advanced acoustic module is
an extension of the original mode theory framework
developed for the iso-velocity case and maintains a
significant speed advantage over other tools. The ability
to generate a fast acoustic performance map over a
scenario area which includes realistic bathymetry and
fully range-dependent temperature and salinity (and by
extension sound speed) allows for more accurate calcu-
lations of operational performance metrics. However,
the ability of the model to account for environmen-
tal information at ever-increasing resolutions leads to
questions of the ability of surface platforms to ade-
quately measure the environment.
An ASW surface platform will typically deploy an
expendable bathythermograph (XBT) probe in order
to determine the variation of water temperature with
Fig. 7 Ten sound speed
(metres per second) profile
samples at 25 locations
uniformly distributed over
scenario area (north to top)
(sound speed profiles show
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depth at a particular location within the scenario area.
The temperature profile is converted to a sound speed
profile and is assumed to apply to the whole scenario
area which could be well in excess of 100 km2. Acoustic
calculations are performed to determine the perfor-
mance of a given sonar sensor against a target of a
particular target strength—in which the propagation of
sound is strongly affected by the gradient of the mea-
sured sound speed profile. It is common knowledge,
amongst oceanographers and acousticians alike, that
the undersea environment is complex and dynamic and
that a sound speed profile measured at a particular
point cannot be applied to the scenario area as a whole.
A tool such as MSTPA can account for as many
discrete sound speed profiles as can be measured over
a scenario area, perhaps by a number of distributed
XBTs. Additionally, the tool can infer such profiles
from 3-D measurements of temperature and salinity
using the Chen–Millero formula (Chen and Millero
1977). Of course, no measurement device can cover
an entire scenario area in both position and depth
to obtain a true picture of the complex underwater
environment. To address this shortfall, NURC is cur-
rently employing underwater gliders to make persis-
tent measurements of temperature and salinity over
large areas at various depths due to the continuous
diving and surfacing movement method they employ.
However, even these data do not cover all points in
position and depth within a scenario area—a typical
glider measurement profile is shown in Fig. 5, colour
coded according to the measured temperature value.
Intelligent extrapolation of the glider measurements is
required to provide oceanographic information at all
points within the water volume. However, any such
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extrapolation process introduces uncertainty as the
range from measured values increases.
Initial results are presented here to investigate the
impact of uncertainty in sound speed—due to the nec-
essary extrapolation of measured values of temperature
and salinity—on the eventual operational performance
metric. The performance metric considered here is
that of the predicted signal excess in decibels for a
submarine of constant 10-dB target strength operating
at a depth of 20 m. Such an acoustic calculation is
strongly dependent on variations in sound speed in both
range and depth as sound is propagated from the sonar
sensor.
The sound speed profiles used in this study were
deduced from 3DSE temperature and salinity predic-
tions. The 3DSE method (Lenartz et al. 2010) combines
several ocean model predictions using optimal weights
computed during a recent past learning period when
observations are available. In the present implemen-
tation, three high-resolution ( 1-km) models are used:
Regional Ocean Modelling System run at NURC, 3-
D Model for Applications at Regional Scale provided
by PREVIMER (www.previmer.fr) and Navy Coastal
Ocean Model run at the Naval Research Laboratory.
The 3DSE forecast is associated with an uncertainty es-
timate based on the assimilation of observations during
the learning period.
The approach to be followed here is that of per-
turbing the input temperature data according to the
estimated uncertainty at each point. Each tempera-
ture perturbation is fed into MSTPA, along with the
mean salinity profile, in order to determine the full
3-D sound speed profile. This results in a number of
possible signal excess maps from which the mean and
standard deviation may be extracted. A convenient sin-
gle output—capturing both the mean and uncertainty
of all perturbations—is the probability of detection.
This calculation considers all perturbed signal excess
values in a cell and determines the fraction with positive
values. A positive value of signal excess, by definition,
will result in a detection of the target submarine.
Figure 6 shows an example of the 3-D sound speed
volume resulting from the super-ensemble temperature
and salinity output. The data shown in Fig. 6 may
be perturbed, according to the estimated uncertainty,
to generate a number of probable outcomes. For this
preliminary analysis, the data were sampled 100 times
over 2 standard deviations—each point within the full
3-D sound speed volume is perturbed assuming a nor-
mal distribution. Figure 7 shows the first 250 m of ten



































































(a) Mean signal excess (dB)
(c) Probability of detection
(b) Standard deviation of signal excess (dB)
showing bathymetry contours
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perturbed sound speed profiles at 25 locations uni-
formly distributed around the scenario area. Note that
in some locations the bathymetry is less than 250 m
resulting in shortened profiles.
All 100 sound speed profiles were then used to
generate 100 signal excess coverage maps, of which
six are shown in Fig. 8. In each case, a generic LFAS
type monostatic sonar was placed at 9.47◦ longitude,
43.5◦ latitude at a depth of 20m. The resulting standard
deviation in signal excess and probability of detection
are shown in Fig. 9.
Due to the complicated nature of underwater sound
propagation, a small change in sound speed profile
gradient in one location may result in a large change
in signal excess at another location. It can be seen in
Fig. 8 that the region to the east of the sensor position
remains fairly constant—note that the samples shown
in the figure were those with greatest deviation from
the mean. Also the region at the extreme west of
the scenario appears fairly constant—corresponding to
deep water and more stable sound speed profile. An
initial inspection shows that the uncertainty in signal
excess appears to increase with sea bed slope. This may
be seen in Fig. 9b in which standard deviation is plotted
together with bathymetry contours.
7 Discussion and conclusion
This study has detailed a number of generic decision
support techniques that may be applied to the problem
of multistatic sonar network design. It is envisaged that
such techniques will be wrapped around the existing
MSTPA to provide a decision support functionality.
The acoustic tool becomes the central metric calculator
within a greater scheme of decision support concepts.
Such a scheme will close the loop between rapid en-
vironmental assessment and the eventual operational
performance of deployed assets. Such a tool may be
used on board a platform in order to assist the tactical
decisions of the operator. The tool therefore transitions
from a planning aid which may be used prior to the
deployment of assets (employing Monte Carlo simu-
lations of potential scenarios), to a more operational
tool on board the assets themselves providing real-time
decision support.
The generic nature of the decision support tech-
niques will allow for integration into different scenar-
ios. This is the aim of the Environmental Knowledge
and Operational Effectiveness program in which a
number of scenarios, the performance of each being a
function of environmental measurements, will be con-
sidered for inclusion in decision support tools. These
include:
– Multistatic network deployment (considered here)
– Optimal deployment of gliders for environmental
sampling
– Planning naval interdiction against piracy
The transition of an otherwise scientific tool, used
as a central metric calculator, into a more operational
decision support system is a powerful ideal. This will fa-
cilitate the timely transition of scientific research tools
into more operational scenarios.
The initial investigation of the effect of uncertainty
within oceanographic predictions will form the basis
for more detailed studies conducted during 2011. This
study has demonstrated the resulting uncertainty in
acoustic coverage as a function of uncertainty in ex-
trapolated temperature and salinity predictions. An
important result will be the sensitivity of the eventual
optimum sensor locations to this uncertainty.
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